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ABSTRACT
The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to
use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats.
Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily
withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as
Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to
the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis,
most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-
state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of
“hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a
powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has
already been seen as a combination of conventional and
unconventional methods, that have been complemented with
other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and
information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of
the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term
“hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of
already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid
threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the
Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially
dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a
traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use
all forms of warfare.
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Introduction
Based on the experiences of the last two decades, the West identified that “hybrid threats”
in the future would come mostly from the non-state actors, often associated with terrorist
groups and organisations that combine regular and irregular warfare, cyber-crime and
other asymmetric methods.
The intervention and interference of Russia in the Ukrainian conflict (from 2014 to
present) triggered a debate about the dangers of “hybrid warfare” when it is initiated by
a powerful, traditional opponent. The new concern is based on the fact that the unlimited
use of means and methods available to a powerful state actor, such as Russia, can produce
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a much greater synergy with the potential to make future wars “dirty” again and returning
the world to a new Cold War.
Although the nature of war in the future will not change, the methods of warfare cer-
tainly will.1 Today’s trend of “hybrid warfare” shares similar characteristics with the proxy
wars fought during the Cold War in third world countries under the control of the great
powers. However, because of many factors such as: globalisation; technology; the internet;
terrorism; and the changing role of international community, today’s wars seem more
complex and difficult to contain.
Analysis of the structure and nature of the hybrid concept of warfare, reveals that it is
obvious that neither is a new nor unique threat with which NATO or the West cannot
cope. This article offers a critical approach when explaining the term “hybrid war” as a
continuation of an already seen doctrine that combines conventional and unconventional
warfare. The specific aim is to demonstrate that although most of the existing literature on
“hybrid warfare” includes the threat from both state and non-state actors, it is more
dangerous when initiated by a strong state actor. Because more capabilities equal a
greater potential, strong state actors, such as Russia, possess greater capabilities when
combining different methods of warfare.
Using the example of the Ukrainian scenario in 2014, in which Russia demonstrated a
hybrid approach, this article offers a breakdown of the structure of hybrid warfare using
the method of analysing: its centre of gravity; critical capabilities; critical vulnerabilities;
and critical requirements. It is an example of a greater efficiency when combining a
wide range of state capabilities with the capabilities of a non-state actor, as seen in
Eastern Ukraine.
This method unveils the intention of Russian hybridity that makes it possible to predict
and propose actions and policies to counter them. Because the hybridity touches many
fields in the societies affected by conflict, this analysis is an appropriate method to under-
stand the dangers of “hybrid warfare” in the future. Beside its purely military element, it
also shows the effects of other aspects of war.
“Hybrid” threat, war and warfare – new words, old concepts
Although the concept of “hybrid war” had emerged earlier,2 the term “hybrid warfare”
became adopted as a new trend amongst military professionals to describe future
warfare since the combined actions of Hezbollah in 2006.3 In the US military, a “hybrid
threat” was defined as “diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, ter-
rorist and criminal capabilities.”4 Furthermore, as it became a trend,5 Fleming describes
the term “hybrid threat” as
an adversary, state or non-state that adaptively and rapidly incorporates diverse and dynamic
combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities, as well as non-
military means, simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict as a unified force to obtain
its objectives.6
According to the European Parliamentary Research Service in reference to the latest
conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria, examples of “hybrid threats” include, but are not
limited to, terrorism, cyber security, organised crime, maritime disputes, space, resource
scarcity and covert operations.7 In addition to these, NATO has also identified as
2 G. VELJOVSKI ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
9.2
05
.12
5.1
91
] a
t 2
1:5
8 1
5 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
“hybrid threats” low intensity and asymmetric conflict scenarios such as: piracy; demo-
graphic challenges; retrenchment from globalisation; and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. All these are “posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their
objectives.”8
Today, many politicians and military professionals use words like “irregular” and
“unconventional war” or “asymmetric and hybrid threats” in a misguided context, as
being an anomaly to the “normal” way of warfare. However, these have always existed
throughout history and it is self-evident that these are not anomalies, but ordinary behav-
iour in war under different circumstances. As Gray discussed, war in any shape no matter
how is categorised is simply a war.9 In general, war, by definition, is regular, irregular or a
combination of both. It seems that the term “hybrid” was introduced as a novelty to
impress (or scare) politicians to trigger particular responses. Giving importance to the
“hybrid threat” as something new suggests that the militaries should reorganise and
reequip to respond to such “new” challenges. Such categorisation may mislead to the
belief that it is a new way of war, when instead it is not offering anything that does not
already exist in the military doctrine.10
The term “hybrid war” became popular after the annexation of Crimea, when the
Western media and military experts tried to explain how the turn of events in Ukraine
caught the Ukrainian government, NATO and EU off guard.11 The coordination and syn-
chronisation of the actions between the Russian military and pro-Russian separatists, were
met with timely supported media coverage and diplomatic effort, but were too good to be
ad hoc. Thus, the immediate response of the Maiden events explained by NATO was an
example of a well-planned Russian hybrid war.12
There are already on-going studies and discussions of what measures are necessary in a
defence strategy to build resilience against adversaries who are capable of waging “hybrid
warfare.” At the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the Alliance confirmed that it
adopted a strategy, “to assist an ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign” with the possibility
of invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.13 Because of the Russians’ aggressive
actions towards Ukraine, NATO made strong efforts “to enhance Ukraine’s resilience
against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats.”14
As the term “hybrid war” became synonymous with the latest Russian strategy, many
western authors started to track its roots. In analysing such type of warfare, it turns out
that there is a strategy pattern already seen during the Cold war. By externally provoking
internal conflicts in a targeted state, the initiating side disrupts and destabilises in order to
achieve its strategic goals.15 Such shaping of geopolitical and economic interests through
sabotaging regional security is not a new concept; today’s hybrid war, therefore, could be
explained as a mere continuation of great powers’ proxy wars.
“Hybrid war” is also not exclusively a Western concept. During the Chinese war of
independence, Mao Tse Tung successfully combined conventional and unconventional
tactics, deploying both symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches on the opponent.16
This came naturally as the Peoples’ Army at first had used purely guerrilla tactics and
then grew in numbers and gained strength sufficient to launch conventional strikes.
The “hybrid approach” is thus desirable if it can be afforded. While complex, at the
same time it is favourable, because it adds conventional military power to the irregular
tactics and techniques. The “hybrid approach” could be the future concept of warfare,
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because it offers a high degree of adaptability by mixing all possible available means: mili-
tary and non-military; conventional and unconventional; and all possible ways in accord-
ance with the opponent’s strengths and vulnerabilities.
The pattern of “hybrid warfare” is not different from many scenarios in which one of
the great powers has manipulated internal socioeconomic problems, ethno-religious con-
flicts or other sensitive disputes in a country. Almost every multiethnic, multireligious or a
developing country has some vulnerabilities that, if challenged from the outside, could
trigger a chain of events towards destabilisation. It has been used over and over again
to disintegrate countries, change regimes or turn a regional policy in favour of the initiat-
ing side. This often looks like a conspiracy theory, but it is a logical strategic reality that
some countries have so many unsolved problems and open questions that, if designated
as a target, it will be relatively easy for the initiating side to guide the process towards
destabilisation.
Although the term “hybrid war” became associated with the non-state actors, it is also
clear that states can successfully wage “hybrid war” at all levels.17 Because states already
have conventional capabilities, it is easier for them to integrate irregular tactics and uncon-
ventional means than vice versa. The great powers practised “hybrid warfare” throughout
the twentieth century and the concept will dominate the conflicts of the future with not
less intensity.18 However, the novelty is that in contemporary and future conflicts,
modern, more advanced, armament and weapons systems are easily accessible to the irre-
gular forces and the non-state actors.19 In addition, cyber capabilities are also easily acces-
sible and are more and more used against powerful states and militaries. Probably that is
the main difference between twentieth- and twenty-first-century hybrid warfare: during
the first period, shaping public opinion using psychological operation and propaganda
was predominantly a state’s luxury, while today, there is no monopoly on manipulation
and propaganda.
Mostly because of the unconventional and the asymmetric part of the hybrid equation,
it is considered that the side that uses hybrid methods, practises so-called unrestricted war,
disregarding lawful and moral limitations established in modern warfare.20 This means
that no matter if the “hybrid approach” is used by a non-state actor or a state, it might
be perceived as unethical. The opposite view is that in every war, each opponent has a
natural right to use whatever means necessary to achieve a favourable position and
better odds for winning.21
Because anyone that uses a “hybrid approach,” either state or non-state actor, must
drive their actions towards a desired end state, suggests that it is possible to predict poten-
tial hybrid threats.22 As an example, if we observe a potential complicated state, through
analysis of its structural vulnerabilities it should be obvious what are the potential targets
to weaken the system from within. It could be interethnic relations, religious strife, bank-
ruptcy, poverty, unemployment, etc. Today’s communications and international laws
facilitate connectivity so that the intentions of a state in the international arena are
both almost impossible to conceal and relatively easy to predict.
Russian version of hybrid warfare in Ukraine
As demonstrated in the Ukrainian scenario, deception and information management
became an important part of the Russian hybrid warfare. To achieve this, the Russians
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revoked the old Soviet unconventional doctrine as part of their information operations
labelled as “reflexive control.”23 This concept in the West was known as psychological
operations; however, the Russian version goes beyond it. They project a set of information
with the intention to deliberately guide the opponent into making the desired moves that
will be either bad for him, or, even if the moves are correct, to be too late and thus useless.
The flow of a large quantity of uncertain or fake information tends to disrupt the decision-
making process of the opponent in a way that he either cannot distinguish what is true or
false or he takes too much time to take a timely decision. The concept of “reflexive control”
allows the initiator to control the decision-making process of the opponent by being one
step in front of him. By overwhelming him with options, the “controller” makes the
opponent respond slowly and, obviously, predicts his move and in many cases guides it
towards a desired goal.
In the Ukrainian scenario, Russia used a “hybrid approach” as a weapon of choice
among others because it is easier to break national resistance through providing “cumu-
lative physical and moral effects produced by defeating or neutralising a series of physical
or moral centres of gravity in multiple campaigns at various levels of wars.”24 To delay
understanding what is happening, as an important tool in their “hybrid approach” the
Russians integrated the element of “reflexive control.”25 The result was the smooth
annexation of Crimea, at the same time indirectly encouraging the pro-Russian separatists
in Eastern Ukraine to rebel against the Ukrainian government. Although hybridity is a
combination of many other efforts, Kasapoglu suggests that “without having a good
understanding of reflexive control operations, one cannot fully grasp Moscow’s modus
operandi.”26
The Russia’s intervention in Crimea followed the same pattern from the Soviet era: the
action of the unmarked soldiers in 2014 who seized the main facilities in the Crimea was
very similar to the initial seizing of key infrastructure in Afghanistan in 1979, conducted
by Soviet troops in Afghan uniforms.27 The Russian annexation of Crimea was done over-
night, unexpectedly. It was, however, very well organised and not to be dismissed as not
thoroughly planned. The annexation started with unmarked soldiers, often in the media
labelled as “little green men,” blocking military and police facilities, setting up barricades
and checkpoints all over Crimea.28 Ukraine lost 12.8% of its territory as a result of the
Russian sponsored “hybrid war.”29 Even though the Russian media said that what hap-
pened in Ukraine was a non-linear approach, the pro-Russian separatists did not fight
as if it were a normal insurgency: they were well-equipped rebels with Russian provided
weapons.
After the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the “hybrid approach” in warfare has
become a synonym for the West as the challenge that needs special attention.30 Irregular
warfare is already known to the west, but what makes the Ukrainian scenario different is
the effective combination of old unconventional tactics with cyber-electronic warfare,
drones, radio jamming and use of sophisticated armament and equipment.31 This is the
main difference from Afghanistan, where the insurgents did not possess the latest technol-
ogy in contrast with the Eastern Ukraine separatists.
Russian “hybrid warfare” against Ukraine is also manifested through “economic sanc-
tions, secret intelligence operations, international propaganda campaigns, purposeful
cyber attacks, diplomatic interventions, and political pressure.”32 Other forms of
Russian “hybridity” include:
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arming foreign insurgents while denying such support; employing inflammatory propa-
ganda; fostering civil unrest amongst foreign minority communities; cutting off energy
supplies; making provocative over-flights and harassment of air, land and sea traffic of
many neighbouring countries, including NATO allies; intimidation and covert operations;
cyber attacks; financial manipulation; kidnapping and illegal border crossings; snap military
exercises and deployments near borders; and casual threats of nuclear weapons.33
The war in the Eastern Ukraine could be perceived as a Cold War style proxy war
between the West and Russia and once more proof that it is very difficult to defeat insur-
gents. It is therefore always a better option if one chooses such strategy to achieve victory
in the long run. In January 2013, the Russian General Valery Gerasimov, announced that
in future wars the Russian military would apply a “new kind of war fought with non-mili-
tary methods to achieve political and strategic goals.”34 The Western media quickly
labelled these actions as “hybrid,” although the combination of measures taken was not
new to the West. As general Gerasimov pointed out, such a kind of war would have to
combine all military, intelligence and information effort to achieve the end state and
avoid large-scale conventional means.35
The Russians chose the “hybrid approach” as their future way of war based on the bitter
experience from the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After retreating from Afghani-
stan, the Russian military failed again in the First Chechen War, facing both conventional
and guerrilla tactics at the same time.36 The only way Russia managed to pacify Chechnya
in the SecondWar was through a mixture of military and diplomatic effort. Thus, the Rus-
sians understood the convenience of the non-linear warfare from the position of a victim
and decided to integrate it with their conventional strength in a new military doctrine. The
product was a “hybrid approach” in possible future wars in their neighbourhood, which
has enough ethnic Russians who can be used as insurgents to support Russian interests.
A “hybrid approach” is easier in an environment similar to Ukraine: ethnic and reli-
gious diversity; social and economic challenges; identity crisis; ambiguous policies; and a
lack of a clear vision for the political end state. The Russian deception tactic was so effi-
cient that even in the West some were convinced that the “little green men” were
Crimean locals, not Russian soldiers.37 The “hybrid approach” offers options for the
side that initiates the action. As the Ukrainian scenario demonstrates, it might be a
prelude to aggression or military intervention. It is a combination of several techniques
such as: fake operations; denial and deception; concealment of the end state; bluffing in
the international arena about the policy development; hiding intentions; influencing
public opinion through the media; and creating ambiguity and uncertainty. The
Russian goal in Ukraine with such hybrid methods was to exploit the domestic weak-
ness created by the Ukrainian crisis.38
Unveiling hybrid war with CG-CC-CV-CR analysis
One of the latest methodologies to understand wars and conflicts is to identify: centres of
gravity; critical capabilities; critical requirements; and critical vulnerabilities (CG-CC-CV-
CR). According to Joe Strange and Richard Iron (p. 18), this methodology is applicable in
any war, and could be used in explaining the hidden agenda in “hybrid wars.”39 The reason
why this particular methodology is part of the military operational art and valid when ana-
lysing “hybrid warfare” is because it accurately unravels the structure of the conflict. It
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starts with an holistic approach with all aspects included and pinpoints the specific parts of
the problem.
The methodology of the analysis of centre of gravity allows answers which are: the ulti-
mate goals of the opponent; what is being attacked; what are his concerns and his focus;
and how he weakens his opponent’s centre of gravity as a source of strength. The Russians
evoked the element of “reflexive control” as part of their “hybrid warfare” to disguise their
end state whilst at the same time providing many options with multiple possible out-
comes.40 This method helped to identify what exactly was the purpose of the “hybrid
approach,” or what was the opponent attacking directly and indirectly.
Since Carl von Clausewitz defined the centre of gravity as something “if struck, it will
most certainly lead to decisive victory,” it became an important tool in warfare and did not
lose its relevance in contemporary military doctrines.41 The centre of gravity is a source of
physical or moral strength that is decisive in winning or losing in war.42 It is “the hub of all
power, on which all depends.”43 Whereas a clear identification of the centres of gravity is
crucial, it is important to understand that it is not constrained only as a purely military
objective, but also as part of more complex political, diplomatic, and economic relations
in contemporary society. This means that it is often attacked by other, non-violent ways
and means, and therefore relevant for the understanding and practice of “hybrid warfare.”
Leaders and populations are considered as centres of gravity at the strategic level; at the
operational and tactical levels, they are usually various combat forces who provide
actual physical strength.44
Critical capabilities are possible actions and effects that make the centre of gravity rel-
evant and important, or what the centre of gravity can do that is of particular concern. In
the concept of “hybrid warfare,” it is valuable to recognise those capabilities because it
helps identifying the mechanisms with which to counter the opponent’s actions or, with
reverse engineering, discover the true strength of the centre of gravity.45
Critical requirements are certain conditions, methods and resources necessary for the
centre of gravity to provide the critical capabilities.46 There are some requirements that
cannot be predicted and controlled; but those that can are important to be detected and
attacked to weaken or destroy the centre of gravity. As there are many requirements in
war, the advantage of the “hybrid concept” is that it can be attacked simultaneously
through a combination of ways and means.
Critical vulnerabilities in war are identified as the weakest link in the opponents’
defence system.47 This is arguably the most interesting part of the equation through the
scope of “hybrid war.” The idea of “hybridity” is to exploit opponents’ vulnerabilities
with minimum risk, the use of military force and cost. In multi-ethnic and multi-religious
societies with social and political challenges, there is much vulnerability from which to
choose.
Inmodern warfare, the centre of gravity cannot be destroyed directly, even with the use of
conventional force. It has to be weakened and attacked frommany directions – thus the use-
fulness of the “hybrid” concept. By exploiting vulnerabilities and their destruction, the
opponents’ critical requirements are compromised.48 The nullifying of the requirements
will disrupt the critical capabilities that will slowly make the centre of gravity irrelevant
and be defeated. The opponent that initiates “hybrid war” on the victim will have to defeat
the victim’s centre of gravity by following three methods: directly making it irrelevant; strip-
ping it of the support that makes it effective; or defeating it by attacking its vulnerabilities.49
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This is evident from the Ukrainian scenario, where Russia used differentmeans andmethods
and pursuing “hybrid warfare” to destroy the Ukrainian centre of gravity.
Analysis
Key events in the Ukrainian crisis
The Ukrainian crisis began in late November 2013 when over 100,000 people with pro-
European sentiments started demonstrations in Kiev against the government over EU
agreement delays.50 Their number grew to 800,000 protestors and on 1 December 2013
people occupied Kiev City Hall and Independence Square.51 This chain of events triggered
Russian concern over pro-European Ukrainians.
The first attempt to project Russian national interest of keeping Ukraine out of the EU
and NATO came on 17 December 2013, when the then Russian President, Vladimir Putin,
offered to buy 15 billion dollars of Ukrainian debt, plus lowering the price of gas.52 This
was a clear sign that Russia was not willing to let Ukraine go, and giving full support to the
pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych.
Between 16 January 2014 and 16 February 2014, the Ukrainian government acted
ambiguously and with confusion, with a great division in the Parliament as clashes with
the police started to cause casualties. When it seemed that the demonstrations were
over, under suspicious circumstances, clashes erupted again on 18 February. Within
two days at least 88 people were killed in Kiev. On 22 February, the Russian-backed Ukrai-
nian President Yanukovych was removed by the Parliament, a clear signal to Russia that
Ukraine had chosen a pro-European future.
Usually, for every conflict there has to be one trigger moment or event. One opinion
why the Russians needed to react with force was when the Ukrainian Parliament voted
to ban the Russian language as a second official language in Ukraine. Although the vote
was later overturned, it was enough to anger the Russian-speaking population in
Eastern Ukraine and gave Russia an excuse to launch military operations in Crimea.
On 27 February 2014, pro-Russian armed men seized key buildings in Simferopol,
Crimea, followed by the so-called “little green men,” unidentified and unmarked. They
seized the Crimean main airports, which marked the introduction of the Crimean annexa-
tion. On 1 March, the Russian Parliament officially approved Putin’s policy to react with
force in Crimea. The Ukrainian government was taken by surprise and failed to react with
military forces stationed at the Crimea. On 16 March, Crimea voted for secession on a
referendum and two days later Crimea became part of the Russian Federation. This hap-
pened so fast that it was likely to have been a spontaneous act, though such an operation
must have been pre-planned.
On 7 April 2014, protestors in the Eastern Ukraine cities of Donetsk, Luhansk and
Kharkiv also called for a referendum. On 15 April, the acting Ukrainian President
voted for anti-terrorist operations in Eastern Ukraine. This was also used by the
Russian media and propaganda to rally support for their kindred Russians. Once the
clashes had started, pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk organised a referendum and
declared independence.
Another event was successfully used by Russia to approve support for kindred Russians
in Ukraine. On 2 May, 42 people were killed in riots in Odessa, most of whom were
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pro-Russian activists trapped in a burning building. The images of the incident sparked
anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Russia and, furthermore, gave Putin another excuse to give
support to pro-Russian separatists.
In order to officially back off from Ukrainian matters militarily, the Russian Parliament
on 25 June cancelled Putin’s authorisation for the use of military force in Ukraine. On 5
July, the separatists abandoned the city of Slavyansk, after a calculated and well-advised
decision that they could not hold their positions and moved to defend Donetsk decisively.
On 17 July, pro-Russian separatists shot down flight MH17, demonstrating that they
somehow possessed a sophisticated air defence system.
On 26 August, Ukrainians captured Russian paratroopers and later exchanged them
for Ukrainian soldiers, proving that Russians were operating in Ukrainian territory.53
On 22 August, a huge Russian supply convoy brought humanitarian aid to the
separatists in Luhansk, without either Ukrainian government control or its permission.
The convoy was theatrically paraded from its starting point in Russia, approaching
slowly towards Ukraine over a period of several days. The eyes of the world were
focused on the convoy, without anything being done as it violated Ukrainian
sovereignty.
On 5 September, a truce was signed in Minsk, between Ukraine and the pro-Russian
rebels, de facto recognising them as a side in a conflict. After this, on 24 September,
NATO reported that Russian troops were withdrawing from Eastern Ukraine and, later,
on 24 October, Putin withdrew troops from the border. The Russian retreat was obviously
due to the truce signed, suggesting mission accomplished. However, in the following
November, NATO again reported that Russian equipment and forces had entered
Eastern Ukraine. The proof for arming the rebels came on 22 January 2015, when Ukrai-
nian troops were overrun at Donetsk airport and on 23 January, the separatist leader
announced an offensive. This meant that the separatists already had the capacity for con-
ventional war. On February 2015 in Minsk, an agreement was made to withdraw all heavy
equipment from the frontline.54
Identifying CG-CC-CR-CV
From the recorded events, facts and figures, using CG-CC-CR-CV methodology, the
Ukrainian conflict has been analysed in order to identify how the Russian “hybridity”
worked in this scenario. Table 1 shows the Russian centre of gravity. Table 2 shows the
Ukrainian centre of gravity.
Based on this analysis, the Russians used a wide range of policies and actions across the
spectrum of warfare to attack the Ukrainian centre of gravity whilst at the same time
protect their own. The list is probably longer as “hybrid” threats are also covert and con-
cealed, thus left to interpretations and speculation.
Furthermore, Table 3 demonstrates the most obvious and fact-based ways and means
that the Russians used to meet their ends in the Ukrainian conflict.
The Russian centre of gravity in Eastern Ukraine is the pro-Russian separatist move-
ment. The Russians needed the separatists to project Russian power and national interests
in Ukraine. Russians would protect their centre of gravity whilst the Ukrainian govern-
ment would try to destroy it. The physical existence of the separatists and their full
strength to resist the Ukrainian forces is extremely important to Russia.
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The most critical capability that the pro-Russian separatists provide to serve Russian
national interests is to deny the Ukrainian government control of Eastern Ukraine. In
most similar cases of insurgencies seeking secession, time is on the side of the separatists.
The second capability is for the separatists to have enough strength to pursue indepen-
dence and secession from Ukraine. Although the west will never accept this as a legitimate
action, it is possible that Eastern Ukrainian separatists might attempt to connect with
Russia via a referendum, similar to that held in the Crimea.
To stay relevant, the separatists’ centre of gravity needed several critical requirements.
The first requirement was military aid from Russia including obtaining heavy weapons
systems and supplying them with an anti-aircraft defence to counter the strong Ukrainian
Air Force. Logistics from Russia was the second critical requirement. According to
counter-insurgency theory, specific geographical conditions cannot favour both sides
equally.55 The fact that Ukraine shares a border with Russia favours the separatists in
Eastern Ukraine because they can easily get supplies and reinforcements when needed.
The requirement for training specialists and advisers is always important for a successful
insurgency. The Russian government admitted that there were Russian volunteers who
fought on the side of the separatists.
Another critical requirement is to gain political and moral support from the local popu-
lation and, moreover, from the Russians themselves. In order to be relevant, the separatists
must demonstrate an ability to govern. For this to be feasible, it would need financial
support from Russia. To preserve the support of the local population, the separatist gov-
ernment must provide the necessary civil services, rule of law and normal way of life.
Insurgent wars are wars of attrition and thus the requirement is to maintain control
Table 1. Russian centre of gravity analysis.
CG CC
. Pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine . Deny Ukrainian government control of Eastern Ukraine
. Pursue independence and secession from Ukraine
. Connect with Russia via referendum like Crimea
CR CV
. Heavy weapon systems from Russia (air defence, artillery)
. Logistics from Russia
. Russian special forces, advisers and “volunteers”
. Support from the population in Eastern Ukraine
. Support from the population in Russia
. Effective governing
. Providing civil services, rule of law, normal way of life
. Ability to sustain for a long time
. Provide energy for population and critical infrastructure
. Connect energy infrastructure with Russia
. If Russia stops supporting (politically, morally, militarily,
logistically)
. If population stop supporting separatists
. If NATO supported Ukrainian government decides to act
in full strength
Table 2. Ukrainian centre of gravity analysis.
CG CC
. Ukrainian government
. Ukrainian security forces
. Wage full-scale military operation to reclaim Eastern Ukraine
. Establish control and end secessionist attempts of separatists
CR CV
. Support from NATO, EU and wider International
community
. Support from Ukrainian population
. Support from population in disputed territories
. Provide civil services and relevancy in the
disputed territories
. Losing popular support to reclaim territory
. Not able to provide civil services in Eastern Ukraine
. If international community recognises sovereignty of disputed
territories
. If NATO and EU back off and suggest reconciliation with Russia by
allowing secession
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over a long period. In order to secure a critical infrastructure and provide energy for the
population, the separatists would eventually have to connect to the Russian energy
infrastructure.
Critical vulnerabilities for the Russians are, if they do not provide sufficient support for
the separatists politically, morally, militarily, and logistically, mostly because of pressure
from the international community. This would impact on the next vulnerable point:
without the necessary help from Russia, the separatists might lose the support of the popu-
lation in Eastern Ukraine. The final vulnerability is the possibility that a NATO-supported
Ukrainian government decided to act in full strength to defend its own territory. In such
case, it is open to question whether or not Russia would risk a full-scale war against
Ukraine.
The Ukrainians have two equally important centres of gravity. The first is if the legit-
imate government was determined to defend Ukraine within its current borders; and the
second is the Ukrainian security forces, who have the actual power to provide the necess-
ary action. NATO is determined to support both centres of gravity. The critical capability
of both is maintaining the potential to wage a full-scale military operation to reclaim
Eastern Ukraine, establish control and end the secessionist attempts of the separatists.
Russians are aware of this capability and of NATO’s determination to back the Ukrainian
government and support the Ukrainian security forces with training, equipment and
weapons if needed.
To stay valid as a centre of gravity, the critical requirement of the Ukrainian govern-
ment is constantly to seek support from NATO, the European Union and the wider
Table 3. Russia’s ways and means in Ukraine conflict.
Ways to attack the Ukrainian centre of
gravity and protect its own Policies and actions
Economics . Attempt to buy Ukrainian loyalty before the escalation in Kiev
. After pro-Russian president Yanukovych was removed, Russia attempt
to blackmail Ukraine with gas supplies
Political . Russia offered open support to Ukraine if the country stays pro-Russian
. After removal of president Yanukovych and the obvious pro-European
path was chosen by the Ukrainian government, Russia provoked
historical sentiments from the Second World War especially the pre-war
status of Crimea
. Russia vows right to protect national interests and kindred Russian
speaking population in the former soviet republic.
. Russian parliament supports Putin and authorises him to use any means
necessary to protect Russian interests in Ukraine, including military
means
Military conventional . Conventional seizure of Crimea
. Deploying military forces on the border with Ukraine, show of force in
the Black Sea against western (US) presence
. Arming rebels with sophisticated and heavy equipment
Military unconventional . Infiltration of Special Forces, advisors and “volunteers” to support pro-
Russian separatists
Information (Psychological, electronic
and, cyber warfare, deception operations,
media and propaganda)
. Shaping public opinion in Russia
. Using attacks on the Russian language, Russian people, reminding of
the Crimean legacy of the Second World War and Nazi crimes, using
Odessa-like incident to spark animosity.
. Projecting Russian power internationally, claiming right to defend
national interests and influence in the regional matters
. Supporting pro-Russian separatists with intelligence
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international community. No less important is the requirement to maintain the will of
the people to preserve Eastern Ukraine. If the government decides to defeat the separa-
tists using force, the support of the Ukrainian population is another critical require-
ment. Nevertheless, another important requirement in similar scenarios is that of
seeking the support of the population in the disputed territories. Not all of the popu-
lation in Eastern Ukraine are willing to break away from Ukraine. The Ukrainian gov-
ernment must demonstrate the will to provide civil services and policy relevance in the
disputed territories. This requirement overlaps with that of the Russians, because both
sides are fighting for the hearts and minds of the local population. Whoever fails to
connect with the population could lose their support.
The most critical vulnerability for the Ukrainian government is if they were to lose
popular support in the attempt to reclaim the lost territory. The Ukrainian population
might lose interest and reconcile with Russia to avoid further bloodshed. Time has
always favoured the insurgents. Not being able to provide civil services in Eastern
Ukraine for a long time also means losing connection with the local population.
Another identified vulnerability is if the international community, NATO and the EU
were to settle with Russia for a regional peace by allowing secession.
The Russian “hybrid war” in Ukraine is evident through the many different ways with
which to attack the Ukrainian centre of gravity whilst protecting its own. From the begin-
ning of the crisis, they deployed a wide range of policies and actions to achieve their end
state which, though concealed, was obvious. The Russian government doubtless will seek
opportunities in former Soviet territories that are populated by ethnic Russians to project
influence and possibly reclaim territories that they consider lost. Economically, the
Russian government literally attempted to buy the Ukrainians loyalty before the protests
in Kiev. When the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych was removed due to pro-
European demonstrations in Kiev, the Russian government tried to force Ukrainian obe-
dience by threatening to withhold the gas supplies.
Politically, the Russians offered open support to Ukraine if the country stayed pro-
Russian. When this attempt failed and President Yanukovych was removed from office,
it was clear to the Russians that the Ukrainian government had chosen the pro-European
path. The evidence of the “reflexive control” is the Russian provocation of historical senti-
ments from the Second World War, and disputing the pre-war status of Crimea. Because
the Ukrainians chose to distance themselves from Russia, Moscow vowed that they would
protect national interests and their kindred Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. In a
very short period of time, the Russian Parliament decided to support President Putin and
authorised him to use any means necessary, including military, to protect Russian interests
in Ukraine.
The military approach was “hybrid” from the beginning of the crisis, using both
conventional and unconventional ways and means. The Russians seized Crimea by
naked force, using conventional military units. To support their claim, they deployed
land forces on the border with Ukraine, backed up with their naval assets in the
Black Sea, and deployed a show of force against any possible western presence near
the Crimean Peninsular. Beside arming the separatists with sophisticated heavy
equipment, the unconventional element is seen with the infiltration of Russian
Special Forces and the presence of advisors and “volunteers” to support pro-Russian
separatists.
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Using the core ideas behind the concept of “hybrid war,” the Russians managed to
combine their older doctrine with the new ways to influence populations and engage
in misdirection, misinformation and propaganda. The information operations were sim-
ultaneously conducted towards shaping public opinion in Russia, Ukraine and the wider
international community. They were especially focused on sending these messages to
pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. The Russians closely followed Ukrainian
decision-making and reacted very quickly. They shaped an anti-Ukrainian posture by
using the attacks on the Russian language and threats to Russian people, reminding
them of the Crimean legacy of the Second World War and Nazi crimes. After the inci-
dent in Odessa, the Russian media heavily exploited the killing of ethnic Russians to
spark animosity in Eastern Ukraine. Through well formulated strategic communication,
the Russians projected their power internationally by claiming the right to defend their
national interests and exercise influence in regional matters.
Conclusion
Since the results of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had not achieved their expectations,
western politicians and military leaders tried to blame the failure of the western way of war
on an unexpected combination of different methods and means by their opponents. That
is why the “hybrid” threats were originally identified within an asymmetrical concept that
became popular to label terrorist organisations and groups, such as non-state actors, that
waged an unrestricted and immoral war.
This view gained a new dimension during the Ukrainian crisis, with the actions that
Russia had taken to influence policies and events in Ukraine. Since then, the characteristics
of “hybridity” and “hybrid warfare” have become a synonym for a danger that can come
from states as well as non-state actors. Many believe that the latest Russian policy is to
assert itself again as a great power and is aimed towards former Soviet spheres of interest
that will destabilise international security.56 In order to achieve this, the Russian govern-
ment reintroduced an old fashion doctrine from the Soviet era based on a combination of
psychological and information operations, covert and concealed military and diplomatic
actions that had been very effective in the past.
So far, the Russian “hybrid warfare” has proved successful in Ukraine. “Hybridity” offers
more clandestine and covert ways to achieve the end state. The international community is
clearly against Russian interference in Ukraine, so the use of conventional assets would risk
provoking a more decisive response. They chose the “hybrid approach” to avoid a full scale
conventional warwithUkraine and, possibly,NATO. Since theUkrainian crisis, this concept
has become a synonym for the Russian efforts to return on the world stage as a global actor.
Knowing the nature of the “hybrid warfare,” it should be relatively easy to understand
and recognise the threat. The problem is when the practitioner of the “hybrid warfare” is a
country such as Russia – one conventionally strong enough to be challenged or sanctioned
by the international community. Any weaker country could not achieve what Russia did in
Ukraine. This means that a truly “hybrid warfare” is possible only in a Russian-like frame-
work. Smaller countries or non-state actors could not apply such a combination of politi-
cal, military, economic, and diplomatic effort without being stopped immediately. Thus,
“hybrid warfare” whilst intended to use low intensity tools, takes great power to
support it.
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This article demonstrates the usefulness of the method of analysis of the centre of
gravity and the elements through which one can attack and destroy the opponent
(through tackling critical capabilities, vulnerabilities and requirements) and as a potential
tool for understanding “hybrid warfare” in a particular scenario. This method allows a
more detailed study of the structure of the conflict in which one or more actors apply
the “hybrid” concept of warfare in order to foresee a wide range of defensive measures
in any future hybrid scenario. In future conflicts, non-state actors can be expected to con-
tinue to threaten international security. However, the Ukraine scenario demonstrates that
it will be even more dangerous when they are initiated by powerful state actors with a
richer arsenal of available ways and means.
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